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JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW, AND SUPPORTING AUTHORITY 
1. Did the trial court err in granting summary judgment for 
appellee Brad Fullmer (hereinafter "Fullmer") and denying partial 
summary judgment for appellants (hereinafter "Garbett") on the 
grounds that Garbett's insurer, State Farm Fire and Casualty 
Company ("State Farm") could not maintain this subrogation action 
because Fullmer, a tenant of Garbett's, was an implied co-insured 
under State Farm's fire insurance policy? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing the granting of summary 
judgment, the court views the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in a light most favorable to the losing party. 
Because a summary judgment resolves only questions of law, the 
court gives no deference to the trial court's legal determinations 
and affirms only if the decision was correct as a matter of law. 
Retherford v. AT&T Communications, P.2d , 201 U.A.R. 
21 (Utah 1992), and cases cited therein. The court may reconsider 
the trial court's legal conclusions. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 
P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
2. Did the district court err in striking paragraphs 5 and 
6 of David Houston's affidavit and in refusing to strike portions 
of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Fullmer's May 14, 1992, affidavit? 
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Standard of Review: Affidavits must set forth facts 
admissible in evidence and must not simply be conclusory in form. 
Norton v. Blackham, 669 P.2d 857 (Utah 1983); Butterfield v. Okubo, 
831 P.2d 97 (Utah 1992). The court must determine whether the 
affidavit was made upon personal knowledge and whether the affiant 
was competent to testify to the matter stated therein. Rule 56, 
U.R.C.P.; Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747 (Utah 1985); Howick 
v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 352 (1972). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
1. Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
2. Utah Code Ann., § 31A-21-108. 
The foregoing rule and statute are set forth verbatim and 
attached hereto as Addendum 1. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Garbett owned the Wedge Apartments in St. George, Utah. 
Garbett had fire insurance on the apartments with State Farm. The 
apartments were damaged as a result of a fire negligently caused by 
Fullmer, one of Garbett's tenants. State Farm paid for the fire 
loss. This is a subrogation action brought by State Farm in the 
name of its insured, Garbett, to recover for the property damage 
caused by Fullmer's negligence. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Garbett filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the 
issue of liability and causation of damages with the only remaining 
issue being the exact amount of damages. Fullmer filed a cross 
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motion for summary judgment. [Record on Appeal, hereinafter R., 
48-49, 57, 121-122] The contested issue on both motions was 
whether a subrogation claim could be maintained against the tenant 
Fullmer. Garbett argued he was entitled to summary judgment on the 
grounds it was undisputed Fullmer had negligently caused the prop-
erty damage. [R. 50-58] Garbett further argued that subrogation 
was not barred under Utah law as applied to the facts of this case. 
[R. 54-57, 166-177] Fullmer admitted his negligence caused the 
fire and damages, [R. 65-66, 224-225] but asserted State Farm could 
not pursue a subrogation claim against him, as a matter of law, 
because he was a co-insured under the fire policy issued by State 
Farm. [R. 127-139] The parties presented memoranda and affidavits 
in support of and in opposition to the respective motions. The 
motions were argued to the trial court on July 22, 1992. [R. 118-
119, 213, 248] 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court 
Despite recognizing Fullmer was clearly negligent in causing 
the fire damage, [R. 251] the trial court denied Garbett's motion 
for partial summary judgment, granted Fullmer's motion for summary 
judgment, and dismissed Garbett's complaint. The trial court con-
cluded, based on his interpretation of Fashion Place Inv. v. Salt 
Lake County, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989), that where the lease 
between Garbett and Fullmer was silent regarding the obligation to 
provide insurance on the apartment building, then Fullmer, as a 
tenant, was presumed to be a co-insured under the State Farm fire 
policy. Therefore, the court concluded State Farm was barred from 
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maintaining a subrogation action against Fullmer, [R. 226, 293] 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment were entered 
on August 18, 1992. [Addendum 2 attached hereto] Garbett's Notice 
of Appeal was filed on September 8, 1992. [Addendum 3 attached 
hereto] 
Although the trial judge based his decision solely on his 
legal interpretation of the Fashion Place Inv. case, and did not 
rely either on Fullmer's affidavit or on various public policy 
arguments raised by Fullmer, [R. 295-296] the court nonetheless 
overruled Garbett's objections to Fullmer1s May 14, 1992, 
affidavit, refusing to strike portions of paragraphs 3 and 5. [R. 
163-165, 213, 233, 295-296] The court also refused to admit 
paragraphs 5 and 6 of David Houston's affidavit. [R. 218, 233, 
258] In striking paragraphs 5 and 6, the court nonetheless held 
that "renter's insurance is available and plaintiffs do not need an 
affidavit to establish and argue the availability of renter's 
insurance to cover personal property owned by an insured and 
liability." [R. 233, 260-261] 
A copy of the Houston Affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum 
4. A copy of the Fullmer Affidavit is attached hereto as Addendum 
5. A copy of the trial court's Order Regarding Motions to Strike 
is attached hereto as Addendum 6. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On February 9, 1988, Fullmer signed a rental agreement with 
Garbett which permitted Fullmer to reside as a tenant in Apartment 
A6 of the Wedge Apartments for the winter and spring quarters of 
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the 1987-88 school year in St. George, Utah. [R. 7, 14, 59, 62-63, 
223-224] Pursuant to the terms of the lease, Fullmer was obligated 
to pay rent of $335 per quarter. [R. 62] 
Under paragraph 1(b) of the lease, Fullmer agreed that: 
Each tenant shall be responsible for all 
damages within their apartment on a joint and 
several basis. [R. 7, 14, 62, 224] 
Under paragraph 4 of the lease, Fullmer agreed that: 
No . . . destruction of property (Landlords or 
tenants's) shall be permitted on the premises 
(apartments, parking lot, sidewalks or lawns). 
[R. 7, 14, 62, 224] [Emphasis added] 
The lease contained no terms or language which required the 
landlord to purchase fire insurance on the apartments. [R. 62-6 3, 
224] 
On February 22, 1988, approximately two weeks after Fullmer 
signed the lease agreement and while he was residing as a tenant in 
the Wedge Apartments, he used a hibachi barbecue at approximately 
12:00 noon on the balcony of Apartment A6. [R. 60, 62-63, 224] 
Following the noon barbecue on February 22, 1988, Fullmer left 
the coals in the hibachi. [R. 60, 224] 
At approximately 7:00 p.m. on February 22, 1988, Fullmer 
prepared the same hibachi for another barbecue on the balcony of 
Apartment A6. In the process, Fullmer dumped the coals remaining 
in the hibachi from the noon barbecue in a cardboard box located in 
the balcony closet [R. 60, 224], which the trial court described as 
"a consummately negligent act." [R. 251] 
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At approximately 1:00 a.m. on February 23, 1988, a fire 
started in the storage area of Apartment A6. The fire was started 
by the smoldering coals and ashes negligently placed in the storage 
closet by Fullmer. [R. 7-8, 14, 65-66, 224-225] 
Garbett insured the Wedge Apartments against fire losses 
through State Farm. State Farm's insurance policy does not include 
tenants (Fullmer) either as named insureds or as insureds by 
definition. [R. 68-97, 220-222, *,25] 
State Farm paid for the fire loss suffered by Garbett in this 
case in an amount in excess of $70,000. This action was brought as 
a subrogation claim against Fullmer pursuant to contractual rights 
provided under Section I and Section II, General Condition No. 7 of 
the insurance policy. [R. 96, 225] State Farm's subrogation claim 
was submitted to Prudential Insurance Company, the home owner's 
insurer for Fullmer, through Fullmer's parents' home owner's policy 
with Prudential. Prudential never claimed to State Farm that 
Prudential's home owner's policy did not provide liability coverage 
for Brad Fullmer. [R. 217-219] 
The lease between the parties is silent on the issue of 
insurance, and there was no discussion between the parties to the 
lease regarding insurance. [R. 62-63, 225] 
The lease provides in part that: 
It is the intent of the landlord and their 
managers to keep The Wedge in superior 
condition. [R. 62, 2:5] 
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The fire which is the subject of this action was caused by 
Fullmer's negligence. There was privity of contract between 
Garbett and Fullmer with respect to the lease agreement. [R. 225] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court erred in concluding that a subrogation 
action could not be maintained against a tenant who negligently 
caused fire damage to the landlord's property even though the lease 
agreement did not require the landlord to provide fire insurance on 
the property. The trial court erroneously interpreted Fashion 
Place Inv. to confer implied co-insured status on Fullmer under 
Garbett's fire insurance policy even though the lease was silent 
regarding the obligation to maintain insurance. In fact, Fashion 
Place Inv. held just the opposite, i.e., a tenant was determined to 
be an implied co-insured only because the lease agreement expressly 
required the landlord to provide fire insurance on the property. 
2. There are three possible circumstances under Utah law 
where a subrogation claim against a tenant could be barred: first, 
where the lease requires the landlord to obtain fire insurance; 
second, where the tenant is a named insured or an insured by 
definition under the policy; and third, where the lease agreement 
expressly exempts the tenant from liability for negligently caused 
fire damage. None of these circumstances are applicable in the 
instant case. The lease did not require Garbett to maintain fire 
insurance, Fullmer was not a named insured or an insured by 
definition under the terms of the policy, and the lease did not 
exempt Fullmer from liability for fire damage. Thus, under both 
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traditional tort and subrogation concepts, this subrogation action 
against Fullmer should not have been dismissed. 
3. Public policy arguments espoused in some jurisdictions as 
a basis for holding a tenant to be a co-insured solely because he 
is a tenant, and thus free from liability on any subrogation 
action, should not be adopted by this court. Such public policy 
considerations ignore the basic premises underlying subrogation, 
i.e., that the loss should be borne by the party whose negligence 
caused it, and that the subrogated insurer's rights are the same as 
the rights of its insured. In the instant case, Garbett clearly 
would have a right of action against Fullmer for negligently caused 
damage. These rights should not be barred simply because Fullmer 
was a tenant. Courts which have adopted this rationale have based 
their conclusions on ill-conceived and/or clearly incorrect factual 
and/or legal assumptions. For example, one erroneous assumption is 
that allowing subrogation against a tenant will force the property 
to be double insured for fire loss. 
4. It is not inequitable for Fullmer to be held responsible 
for his own negligence. Such is the common law rule absent an 
express agreement to the contrary. 
5. In the event the Court of Appeals believes an affidavit 
is necessary to establish the availability of renter's insurance to 
cover tenant's personal liability, then the trial court's striking 
of paragraphs 5 and 6 of David Houston's affidavit should be 
overruled and the entire affidavit admitted. If no such affidavit 
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is necessary, then Garbett withdraws his objection to the court's 
striking of those paragraphs. 
6. If the Court reverses the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for Fullmer, then the Court should enter partial summary 
judgment for Garbett. The Court should reverse the trial court's 
overruling of Garbett's objections to portions of paragraphs 3 and 
5 of Fullmer's affidavit regarding his reasonable expectations 
about insurance coverage on the building. Those provisions were 
conclusory in nature and did not properly meet the requirements of 
Rule 56 for an affidavit. Moreover, reasonable expectations of the 
parties is not a basis for establishing co-insured status under 
Utah law. The Utah Supreme Court has rejected the reasonable 
expectations doctrine in construing insurance policies. Fullmer's 
affidavit does not create any material fact issue which would 
preclude the Court of Appeals from ordering entry of partial 
summary judgment for Garbett. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT FOR FULLMER AND DISMISSING STATE 
FARM'S SUBROGATION CLAIM. 
The trial court's granting of summary judgment for Fullmer was 
based solely on the court's interpretation of Fashion Place Inv., 
Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 776 P.2d 941 (Utah App. 1989), stated as 
follows: 
Where the lease between these parties was 
silent with respect to insurance or any 
obligation to provide insurance, the court 
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concludes, based upon the authority of Fashion 
Place Inv. v. Salt Lake County, . . . that the 
defendant-lessee Fullmer is presumed to be a 
co-insured under the landlord's fire insurance 
policy and therefore no subrogation action may 
be prosecuted against the tenant Fullmer. 
[R. 226] Notwithstanding the foregoing conclusion, the trial court 
readily acknowledged "there's no question in my mind that this case 
needs to go up to the Court of Appeals because I think they have 
left a very questionable circumstance in the Fashion Place Inv. 
case." [R. 293] 
It is Garbett's position that the trial court misinterpreted 
Fashion Place Inv., and in the process adopted a broad concept 
barring subrogation against a tenant solely because he is a tenant. 
None of the applicable Utah cases have adopted such a concept, and 
Garbett urges this Court not to do so. 
A. Utah Law Allows Subrogation Against a Tenant Except in 
Three Specific Circumstances, None of Which Are Present 
in the Instant Case. 
The applicable Utah cases set forth three circumstances in 
which a subrogation claim may not be maintained against a negligent 
party defendant -- first, where the fire insurance policy includes 
the defendant as a named insured or as an insured by definition, 
Board of Education of Jordan School Dist. v. Hales, 566 P.2d 1246 
(Utah 1977); Fashion Place, Inv., supra; second, where the lease 
agreement exempts or excuses the tenant from liability for damages 
caused by fire, see Bonneville on the Hill Co. v. Sloane, 572 P.2d 
402 (Utah 1977); and third, where the lease agreement specifically 
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requires the landlord to maintain fire insurance, Fashion Place 
Inv. v. Salt Lake County, supra. 
1. Tenant Is Named Insured or Insured By Definition, 
In Hales, supra, the defendant against whom the subrogation 
action was asserted was a subcontractor, and the insurance policy 
expressly stated that subcontractors on the job were covered 
insureds. The insurer even paid a first-party claim made by the 
defendant subcontractor. Under those circumstances, the Utah 
Supreme Court held no subrogation action could be maintained. 
Although the defendant in Hales was not a tenant, the principle set 
forth is applicable to the instant case. Fullmer was not a named 
insured, nor was he an insured by definition under the State Farm 
policy, and therefore State Farm's subrogation claim cannot be 
barred on those grounds. 
2. Lease Exempts Tenant's Liability. 
In Bonneville, supra, defendant-tenant had a lease agreement 
with the landlord which expressly absolved the tenant from damages 
caused to the premises by fire. Although the case does not speci-
fically discuss subrogation, it is clear that the landlord obtained 
and paid for fire insurance. The Supreme Court held no claim could 
be maintained by the landlord against the tenant because of the ex-
culpatory clause in the lease. Since an insurer's rights could be 
no greater than the insured's (landlord's), the exculpatory clause 
would not only bar the landlord's claim, but also a subrogation 
claim of the insurer. See also Rizzuto v. Morris, 22 Wash. App. 
11 
951, 592 P.2d 688 (Wash. App. 1979) (court disallowed subrogation 
where lease exempted tenant from liability for fire damage). 
The Bonneville rule does not apply to Fullmer. The lease with 
Garbett does not exempt Fullmer from liability for damages caused 
by fire. On the contrary, under paragraph 4 of the lease, Fullmer 
expressly agreed that he would not destroy any property, including 
the apartments. He breached that contractual duty by negligently 
causing over $70,000 in fire damage to the property. 
3• Lease Requires Landlord to Provide Fire Insurance. 
In Fashion Place Inv., the lease specifically required the 
landlord to obtain fire insurance on the building. The court 
concluded the tenant was a de facto co-insured under the policy 
because of this express requirement for the landlord to purchase 
insurance as part of its contractual obligations owed under the 
lease to the tenant. The court stated that ,f[w]here the insured 
[landlord] is required by contract or lease to carry insurance for 
the benefit of another, the other party [tenant] may attain the 
status of a de facto coinsured even if not named as an insured in 
the policy obtained." 776 P.2d at 944-45 (emphasis added). 
There is a reasonable basis for the Fashion Place Inv. 
holding, namely that where the landlord has specifically promised 
to purchase fire insurance, then that insurance is part of the 
consideration to which the tenant is entitled under the terms of 
the lease, and the insurance so purchased is intended to cover the 
risk of the tenant's negligent acts. However, just like the Hales 
and Bonneville holdings, the Fashion Place Inv. rule also does not 
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apply to Fullmer because his lease did not require Garbett, nor did 
Garbett ever agree, to provide fire insurance on the apartment 
complex. 
B. A Lease Which i s S i len t on Insurance Does Not Make 
Fullmer a Co-Insured Under S ta te Farm's Fi re Policy. 
The t r i a l court recognized tha t no Utah case, including 
Fashion Place Inv . , has ever held a tenant , (sole ly because of his 
s t a tus as a t enan t ) , to be a co-insured under a f i r e insurance 
policy obtained by his landlord. 
If the Court of Appeals had intended to adopt such a broad 
p r inc ip le in Fashion Place Inv . , i t could have eas i ly said so. I t 
did not.1 The Court ' s express re l iance on the language in the 
lease requir ing the landlord to purchase f i r e insurance as a basis 
for denying subrogation shows the l imited nature of the holding. 
Yet contrary to tha t holding, the t r i a l court ruled tha t a tenant 
i s a co-insured when the lease says nothing about insurance. Thus, 
instead of following Fashion Place Inv . , the t r i a l court reached 
the exact opposite r e s u l t . 
Garbett purchased f i r e insurance to pro tec t h is i n t e r e s t s as 
owner of the property, not because of any cont rac tua l obl igat ion 
owed to Fullmer. If Garbett had not purchased f i r e insurance, 
Fullmer would not have had a claim for breach of con t rac t , but when 
In fact, the Court of Appeals clearly identified the issue raised on appeal by Fashion Place was 
whether the lease provision requiring the landlord to obtain insurance made the tenant a coinsured. ("Fashion 
Place argues on appeal that the t r ia l court erred in ruling that Salt Lake County is a comsured of the 
landlord. Fashion Place contends that a lease provision requiring the landlord to provide insurance does not 
by itself expressly or impliedly exempt the tenant from the financial consequences of its own negligence." 776 
P 2d at 943) 
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Fullmer negligently burned up the building, Garbett could have 
maintained an action against Fullmer for damages. See Cluff v. 
Culmer, 556 P. 2d 498 (Utah 1976), confirming the tenant's common 
law implied covenant not to damage leased premises, and citing with 
approval 49 Am.Jur.2d Landlord and Tenant § 922 which states: 
This implied covenant is as much a part of the 
contract of lease as if it were incorporated 
into it by express language. If, by the 
negligence . . . of a tenant, the demised 
property is materially injured, he is liable 
for the resultant damage, and the landlord may 
recover the amount thereof from him . . . . 
And since this is a subrogation claim, State Farm's rights of 
recovery are as great as the landlord's own rights to recover for 
damage caused by its tenant. U.S. Fidelity & Guar, v. Let's Frame 
It, 759 P.2d 819, 820 (Colo. App. 1988). Moreover, pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 31A-21-108, the legislature has expressly 
authorized insurers to maintain subrogation actions in the name of 
their insureds. 
Garbett submits the trial court's legal conclusion that 
Fullmer was a co-insured in the face of a lease silent on insurance 
was wrong. It was not only an incorrect interpretation of Fashion 
Place Inv.'s specific holding on subrogation against a tenant, but 
also ignored the basic concepts underlying the principle of 
subrogation, Specifically, subrogation authorizes the insurer who 
paid the loss to step into the shoes of its insured and recoup its 
losses from the party whose negligence caused the loss. See 
Fashion Place Inv., 776 P.2d at 944. This Court can correct the 
trial court's error by reversing the entry of summary judgment for 
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Fullmer and instructing the trial court to enter partial summary 
judgment for Garbett. 
C. Public Policy Does Not Mandate Barring State Farm's 
Subrogation Claim, 
In a recent decision, the Iowa Supreme Court held that the 
landlord's insurer could maintain a subrogation action for fire 
damage negligently caused by a tenant. Neubauer v. Hostetter, 485 
N.W.2d 87 (Iowa 1992). The facts in Neubauer are instructive. 
Joyce Hostetter and her husband rented a farmhouse from the 
Neubauers, who maintained fire insurance on the house. Hostetters 
obtained renter's insurance to insure their personal belongings and 
to cover them for personal liability. Shortly after acquiring this 
policy, Joyce Hostetter negligently burned down the entire 
farmhouse. 
Neubauers' fire insurer paid them $22,000 on the loss, and 
Neubauers incurred $6,176 in uninsured losses. Neubauers and their 
insurer (Farmers Mutual) brought suit against Hostetters. 
Hostetter's renters' insurer (Auto-Owners Mutual) defended the case 
and agreed it would be obligated to pay any judgment entered. 
Defendants (through Auto-Owners Mutual) moved for summary 
judgment, arguing that Neubauers' insurer was "precluded as a 
matter of law from exercising any subrogation rights against a 
tenant." 485 N.W.2d at 88. The trial court rejected Hostetters' 
argument concluding they were not co-insureds under Neubauers' fire 
insurance policy, and judgment was thereafter entered in favor of 
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plaintiffs and against Ms. Hostetter. Ms. Hostetter appealed, and 
the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed. 
Although it was clear Ms. Hostetter was not a named insured 
under the Farmers Mutual fire policy, she argued on appeal that she 
was an implied co-insured based on the rationale of Sutton v. 
Jondahl, 532 P.2d 478 (Okla. App. 1975). The Iowa Supreme Court 
acknowledged the Sutton holding "that subrogation was not available 
because a tenant is considered a co-insured of the landlord absent 
an express agreement to the contrary" 485 N.W.2d at 88, and further 
identified the four major public policy reasons relied upon in 
Sutton for denying a subrogation claim against a tenant: (1) the 
landlord and tenant each have an insurable interest in the 
property; (2) the tenant pays for part of the insurance premium 
with his rent; (3) tenants reasonably rely on the landlord to buy 
fire insurance and to cover the tenant; and (4) equity requires the 
insurer, not the tenant, to bear the risk of loss. 
The Iowa Supreme Court noted, however, that, "[s]everal courts 
have rejected Sutton and its progeny." Id_. For example, Page v. 
Scott, 263 Ark. 684, 567 S.W.2d 101 (1978), where the Arkansas 
Supreme Court "rejected the 'fiction' that the tenant paid the 
insurance premium as a part of the rent, finding instead that 
market factors control the setting of rental prices." 485 N.W.2d 
at 89. The Arkansas Court further succinctly identified those 
circumstances where subrogation would not be allowed: 
^ince Mr. Hostetter was not at fault for starting the fire, the claims against him were dismissed. 
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Appellee contends, however, that a 
lessor's insurer has no subrogation to 
lessor's claim against the lessee. This 
undoubtedly would be true if the parties had 
agreed as part of the transaction that 
insurance would be provided for the mutual 
protection of the parties. . . . It would 
also be true if such an agreement could be 
implied from the terms of the agreement 
between the parties. Such an agreement has 
been implied when the terms of the lease 
require the landlord to carry insurance at the 
expense of the tenant, when the tenant's 
contractual obligation to return the leased 
property in good condition excepts loss by 
fire and when the agreement requires the 
lessor to carry insurance and use the proceeds 
for restoration of the property insured. 
567 S.W.2d at 103 (emphasis added). As previously noted, none of 
these circumstances exist in the instant case. 
The Neubauer court further examined the issue by reviewing 6A 
J. Appleman, Insurance Law St Practice § 4055 (1991 Supp.), wherein 
Appleman criticized what he perceived as "the modern trend . . . to 
find . . . a tenant is a co-insured based on the rationale in 
Sutton." 485 N.W. at 89. Quoting from Appleman, Neubauer stated: 
Sutton, the leading modern case denying 
subrogation of lessees, cites no cases for the 
proposition that the lessee is a co-insured of 
the lessor, comparable to a permissive user 
under an auto insurance policy. Contrary to 
the court's statements, the fact both parties 
had insurable interests does not make them co-
insureds. The insurer has a right to choose 
whom it will insure and it did not choose to 
insure the lessees, and under this holding the 
lessee could have sued the insurer for loss 
due to damage to the realty, e.g., loss of use 
if policy provides such coverage. Cases 
following Sutton, however, have at least 
impliedly restricted the co-insurance 
relationship to one limited solely to the 
purpose of prohibiting subrogation. 
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Id. (emphasis added) Having considered the various positions, 
the Iowa Supreme Court rejected Hostetter's argument that she was 
a co-insured. The court stated: 
Consistent with the views expressed in the 
Appleman treatise, we also do not accept the 
rationale that the tenant has propounded in 
the present case. It is based on the theory 
that, because the whole is equal to the sum of 
its parts, fire insurance on an entire dwell-
ing includes the interest of both landlord and 
tenant as a matter of law. This argument 
disregards the fact that these are separate 
estates capable of being separately valued and 
separately insured. To the extent that defen-
dant and her husband also had a property 
interest in the dwelling, it was not automati-
cally insured under the landlords' policy. 
There is nothing in the present record to sug-
gest that the proceeds paid to the Neubauers 
by Farmers Mutual exceeded the value of the 
landlords' reversionary interest in the prop-
erty. Even if such evidence existed, this 
would only establish an over-evaluation by the 
insurer of the landlords' loss. 
485 N.W.2d at 89-90. The court further noted, analogous to 
the holding in Fashion Place Inv., that it might have reached a 
different result " [i]f the landlords had agreed to insure the 
tenants' interest in the property. . .." 
Neubauer properly identifies the fallacies associated with 
Sutton's blanket conclusion that a tenant is a co-insured simply 
because he is a tenant. As noted, the Hostetters had their ov/n 
insurance policy covering personal liability as well as their own 
personal property. In the instant case, Fullmer is insured through 
his parents' home owner's policy for liability. Sutton and its 
progeny erroneously surmise that allowing a subrogation claim 
against a tenant effectively requires the property to be double 
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insured against fire by the landlord and the tenant. This is 
clearly not the case. 
Moreover, for some inexplicable reason, Sutton finds it 
inequitable to hold a tenant responsible for his own negligent 
acts. Such a conclusion runs counter to the basic premises 
underlying common law negligence and tort theory. 
Furthermore, cases which are perceived by some to follow 
Sutton, in many instances are factually distinguishable or simply 
do not hold that tenant status alone makes one a co-insured. For 
example, that was not the holding in Fashion Place Inv. In Safeco 
Insurance Companies v. Weisgerber, 767 P.2d 271 (Idaho 1989), and 
Rizzuto v. Morris, supra, the leases specifically excepted the 
tenant from liability for fire damage. In Rizzuto the court 
focused on the intent of the parties. In addition to the specific 
exculpatory language in the lease exempting the tenant from fire 
damage liability, there was evidence the landlord expressly told 
the tenant at least two times that he had fire insurance on the 
building when the tenant asked about insurance. No such facts 
exist in the instant case. In Alaska Insurance Co. v. RCA Alaska 
Communications, 623 P.2d 1216 (Alaska 1981), the court narrowly 
stated its holding as follows: 
Therefore, we hold that if the landlord 
in a commercial lease covenants to maintain 
fire insurance on the leased premises, and the 
lease does not otherwise clearly establish the 
tenant's liability for fire loss caused by its 
own negligence, by reserving to the landlord's 
insurer the right to subrogate against the 
tenant, the tenant is, for the limited purpose 
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of defeating the insurer's subrogation claim, 
an implied co-insured of its landlord. 
623 P.2d at 1220 (emphasis added). Obviously RCA Alaska Commun. 
does not support the proposition that tenant status alone makes one 
a co-insured. Yet even this limited holding creates the strange 
result that a landlord could recover uninsured losses from his 
tenant in the same case in which the insurer's subrogation claim is 
disallowed. 
Also, although in Safeco Insurance Co. v. Capri, 705 P. 2d 659 
(Nev. 1985), subrogation was denied, the facts showed the landlord 
expressly agreed to maintain fire insurance on the property. 
Sutton's position that the tenant is a co-insured under the 
landlord's fire policy because they both have insurable interests 
in the same property is factually incorrect. If Fullmer indeed had 
any "insurable" interest, it encompassed nothing more than one 
apartment. Yet there is no indication damage was confined to that 
single apartment. 
Adopting the Sutton rationale would effectively eliminate 
subrogation by a landlord's insurer against a tenant unless there 
was an agreement to the contrary. 
However, even Sutton's apparent exception to the blanket rule 
barring subrogation where one can show an agreement to the 
contrary, is an illusory notion, as a practical matter. What type 
of agreement would satisfy Sutton? Would an agreement making the 
tenant responsible for the damages he causes be sufficient? If so, 
the lease between Garbett and Fullmer contains such a provision. 
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The lease specifically states that the property shall not be 
destroyed. Yet, such an express agreement is unnecessary for a 
landlord to hold a tenant responsible for damages negligently 
caused by the tenant. The tenant is responsible for such damage as 
a matter of common law, Cluff v. Culmer, supra. Thus, such an 
agreement expressly written into the lease gives a landlord no more 
rights than he has as a matter of common law. Presumably, such 
language would not constitute Man agreement to the contrary" under 
Sutton. 
Sutton would probably allow subrogation if the lease contained 
language specifically stating that tenants are not co-insureds 
under any fire insurance policy purchased by the landlord on the 
property. The prospect, as a practical matter, of such language 
being included in a typical apartment lease is almost nil. 
Specifically, the Garbett-Fullmer lease says nothing whatsoever 
about insurance. If neither party even addresses the issue of 
insurance, how could there ever be an agreement between the parties 
contrary to Sutton's holding that a tenant is a co-insured simply 
because he is a tenant. Thus, Sutton's exception to the blanket 
rule of co-insured status for tenants, although it perhaps sounds 
fair, has no substance. 
Moreover, the concept that a negligent party is only responsi-
ble for his negligence if he expressly so agrees turns traditional 
tort law upside down. Indeed, Utah law does not allow a negligent 
party to avoid responsibility for his conduct in the context of an 
indemnity agreement unless the agreement clearly and unequivocally 
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expresses the indemnitor's intent to indemnify the indemnitee for 
his own negligence. See Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co. , 793 P.2d 
362 (Utah 1990) . 
Page v. Scott, supra, also addressed and rejected the policy 
argument that allowing subrogation gives the insurer a windfall: 
[W]e are not persuaded by appellee's 
[windfall] argument . . . . The same might be 
said about a recovery from a third party 
liable because of negligently causing a fire. 
It also could be said of the insurer affording 
collision coverage to an automobile owner 
suffering damage from the negligent acts of 
another. We have never recognized the 
validity of such an argument. 
567 P.2d at 104 (emphasis added). This court should reject 
the so-called public policy arguments advanced by Sutton and other 
courts against allowing subrogation. The three circumstances set 
forth in the Utah cases are more than sufficient to protect tenants 
from improper subrogation claims, without emasculating the entire 
principle of subrogation in the landlord-tenant context. 
POINT II. 
PARAGRAPHS 5 AND 6 OF THE HOUSTON AFFIDAVIT 
ARE RELEVANT AND THERE WAS ADEQUATE FOUNDATION 
FOR ADMISSION. 
The trial court struck paragraphs 5 and 6 of David Houston's 
affidavit finding they were either not relevant or not made upon 
personal knowledge. Paragraphs 5 and 6 were presented to address 
Sutton's public policy argument that allowing subrogation would 
result in the property being double insured for fire. Houston 
showed through his affidavit that renter's insurance is available 
to cover a tenant for personal liability, as well as to cover the 
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tenant's personal property. His statements were made based upon 
his personal knowledge and experience as a State Farm claim 
superintendent with extensive experience involving coverage 
provided by homeowners and fire insurance policies. [R. 217-18, 
255-56] 
Even though the trial court struck paragraphs 5 and 6, the 
court nonetheless held that no affidavit was necessary for State 
Farm to establish and argue the availability of renter's insurance 
to cover personal property and liability of a tenant. In the event 
this Court agrees that no affidavit is necessary then Garbett's 
objection to the court's striking of paragraphs 5 and 6 is 
withdrawn. 
Garbett raises this point in the brief simply to preserve his 
rights in case this Court determines an affidavit regarding 
availability of renter's insurance is necessary. Garbett believes 
the trial court is correct in its conclusion that no affidavit is 
necessary. Numerous references in various cases to renter's 
insurance show without question that such insurance is available to 
insure tenants against their own personal liability. Neubauer v. 
Hostetter, supra, is a clear example of this. Other cases which 
make reference to the availability of renter's insurance as a 
matter of course include Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
Mardanlou, 607 P.2d 291 (Utah 1980); Morales v. Fansler, 258 Cal. 
Rptr. 96 (Cal. App. 5 Dist. 1989); Smith v. Sellers, 747 P.2d 15 
(Colo. App. 1987). 
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POINT III, 
PORTIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 3 AND 5 OF FULLMER !S 
MAY 14, 1992 AFFIDAVIT SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
STRICKEN. 
Fullmer submitted his May 14, 1992, affidavit for the purpose 
of establishing a fact issue which would preclude the court from 
granting summary judgment in favor of Garbett. Fullmer theorized 
that if the court granted Garbett's motion, it would imply an 
obligation on the tenant to purchase insurance. Garbett obviously 
disagrees with that theory. He never argued that Fullmer was 
required to purchase insurance on the apartment building. If this 
court reverses the trial court's grant of summary judgment for 
Fullmer, it should order the trial court to enter partial summary 
judgment, as requested, in favor of Garbett. There is no reason to 
find any material fact issue based on Fullmer's affidavit. 
The underlying premise of Fullmer's argument is that it would 
be unfair to allow a subrogation claim against him presumably 
because he has no insurance to cover the claim. Obviously, this is 
incorrect. First, allowing the subrogation claim does not obligate 
him to purchase fire insurance for the entire building. Second, 
the facts show Fullmer is insured for this liability through his 
parents' homeowner's policy. To argue unfairness under these 
circumstances is specious. 
Fullmer's affidavit supposedly establishes his reasonable 
expectation that the landlord would provide fire insurance on the 
building. His statements in paragraphs 3 and 5 are based on 
hindsight, and are not statements of his actual state of mind at 
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the time he entered the lease. The language of his affidavit was 
"I would have expected that the owner would have his own insurance 
of whatever type he felt necessary," and "I would have expected 
that the owner would have insurance in the event this occurred." 
[R. 144-45] (emphasis added) Significantly, Fullmer1s affidavit 
does not state that he reasonably expected Garbett to carry 
insurance which would cover Fullmer for his own negligent acts. 
Fullmer's affidavit does not meet the requirements for affidavits 
under Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P., but is instead simply a reflection of 
his opinions and conclusions after the fact. Such is not adequate. 
See Webster v. Sill, 675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983). 
Finally, Fullmer's statement of his reasonable expectations 
under the lease is not a basis to create a material fact issue in 
any event. In Allen v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins., 839 P.2d 
798 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the "reasonable 
expectation" doctrine in interpreting coverage under an insurance 
policy. The same rationale should apply to the lease agreement in 
this case. 
The Court of Appeals can order the trial court to enter 
summary judgment in favor of Garbett because no material issues of 
fact preclude such. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should reverse the trial court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Fullmer and denial of summary judgment 
for Garbett. The Court should allow State Farm's subrogation 
action to be maintained against Fullmer under the facts and 
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circumstances of this case and should order the trial court to 
enter partial summary judgment in favor of Garbett and against 
Fullmer on the issue of liability and causation of damages and 
remand for a trial or other appropriate hearing solely for the 
determination of the exact amount of damages. 
DATED this / Ip "" day of d~* 1993. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By J^tA^fA/ '/ 
Stuart H. Schultz 
H. Burt Ringwood 
Attorneys for Appellant: 
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I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief were jnailed, first class postage prepaid, this 
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KEITH W. MEADE 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P. 0. Box 11008 
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84147-0008 
203387nh 
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ADDENDUM INDEX 
1. Rules and Statutes 
2. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment dated 
August 18, 1992. 
3. Bryson Garbett's Notice of Appeal dated September 3, 1992. 
4. Affidavit of David K. Houston dated July 20, 1992. 
5. Affidavit of Brad Fullmer dated May 14, 1992. 
6. Order Regarding Motions to Strike dated August 18, 1992. 
ADDENDUM 1 
Rule 56. Summary judgment. 
(a) For claimant. A partv seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversv, and directing such further proceedings in the 
action as are just Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented oi opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories 
or further affidavits When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided m this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided m this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial If he does not so respond, summary mde-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present bv 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidav.ts presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt 
Compiler's Notes — This rule is similar to Cross-Refer<>nrp« r m ( o m f 
RuIe56tFRcp ^iTixttZTer^ p B y' 
31A-21-108. Subrogat ion actions. 
Subrogation actions may be brought by the insurer m the name of its in-
sured 
histor\ C 1953, 31A 21 108, enacted b \ Lffectivc Oat* s U w s 1986 ch 204 
L. 1986 ch 204, § 141 t> 299 m<ikcs the icL effective on July 1 1986 
NOTES TO DfrCISlON^ 
< ited in Pickhover v Smith s Mgt Corp 
" 1 P 26 (>G4 (Utah Ct App 1989) 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON 
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVID 
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE 
WATER CORPORATION, and BRIAN 
STEPHENSEN, Partners, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
BRAD FULLMER, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 910500012 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter was before the court pursuant to competing Motions 
for Summary Judgment. The court, having considered the pleadings 
on file, the Memorandum submitted with respect to the Motion, and 
the argument of counsel on July 22, 1992, the court makes the 
following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The court finds that the following facts are not disputed: 
1. On February 9, 1988, Brad Fullmer ("Fullmer") signed a 
rental agreement with plaintiffs (hereinafter collectively referred 
to as "Garbett" or "Landlord) which permitted Fullmer to reside as 
a tenant in Apartment A6 of The Wedge Apartments for the winter and 
spring quarters of 1987-88 school year in St. George, Utah. The 
rental agreement attached to plaintiff' s Memorandum dated April 21, 
1992, is a true and correct copy of said rental agreement. 
2. Under paragraph 1(b) of the lease, Fullmer agreed that: 
Each tenant shall be responsible for all 
damages within their apartment on a joint and 
several basis. 
3. Under paragraph 4 of the lease, Fullmer agreed that: 
No . . destruction of property (landlord' s or 
tenant's) shall be permitted on the premises 
(apartments, parking lot, sidewalk or lawns). 
4. The lease contained no terms or language which required 
the landlord to purchase fire insurance on the apartments. 
5. On February 22, 1988, while residing as a tenant in The 
Wedge Apartments, Fullmer used a Hibachi barbecue at approximately 
12: 00 noon on the balcony of Apartment A6. 
6. Following the noon barbecue on February 22, 1988, Fullmer 
left the coals in the Hibachi. 
7. At approximately 7:00 p.m. on February 22, 1988, Fullmer 
prepared the same Hibachi for another barbecue on the balcony of 
Apartment A6. In the process, Fullmer dumped the coals remaining 
in the Hibachi from the noon barbecue in a cardboard box located in 
the balcony closet. 
8. At approximately 1: 00 a. m. on February 23, 1988, a fire 
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started in the storage area of Apartment A6. The fire was started 
by the smoldering coals and ashes negligently placed in the storage 
closet by Fullmer. 
9. Plaintiffs insured The Wedge Apartments against fire 
losses through State Farm Fire & Casualty Company. 
10. The insurance policy does not include tenants either as 
named insureds or as insureds by definition. 
11. State Farm paid for the fire loss suffered by the 
plaintiff in t M s case in an amount in excess of $70, 000. 00. This 
action was brought as a subrogation claim against Fullmer pursuant 
to contractual rights provided under Section I and Section II, 
General Condition No, 7 of the insurance policy. 
12. The lease between the parties is silent on the issue of 
insurance. There was no discussion between the parties to the 
lease regarding insurance. 
13. The lease provides in part that: 
It is the intent of the landlord and their 
managers to keep The Wedge in superior 
condition. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The fire which was the subject of this action was caused 
by Fullmer7 s negligence. 
2. There was privity of contract between the landlords and 
Fullmer with respect to the lease agreement. 
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3. Where the lease between these parties was silent with 
respect to insurance or any obligation to provide insurance, the 
court concludes, based upon the authority of Fashion Place Inv. v. 
Salt Lake County. 776 P. 2d 941 (Utah App. 1989) that the defendant-
lessee Fullmer is presumed to be a co-insured under the landlord1 s 
fire insurance policy and therefore no subrogation action may be 
prosecuted against the tenant Fullmer. 
DATED this J 0 day of August, 1992. _ ^ 
BY THE COURT: 
Approved as to form: 
HQ&J^C able * James L. Shumate 
Stuart Schultz 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON 
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVID 
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE 
WATER CORPORATION, and BRIAN 
STEPHENSEN, Partners, 
P l a i n t i f f s , 
vs 
BRAD FULLMER, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 910500012 
Judge James L. Shumate 
• * * 
This matter came before the court on July 22, 1992 pursuant to 
competing Motions for Summary Judgment. The court, having 
previously entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and 
having made its ruling in oper court, hereby 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that plaintiffs' Motion for 
Summary Judgment is denied, defendant' s Motion for Summary Judgment 
is granted, and plaintiff s claims against the defendant be and 
hereby are dismissed, with prejudice and on the merits. 
DATED this / f day of August, 1992. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form: 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the I j) day of 
August, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage fully prepaid, to the following: 
Stuart Schultz 
H. Burt Ringwood 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
y'W 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON 
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVTD 
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE 
WATER CORPORATION, and BRIAN 
STEPHENSEN, Partners, 
Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
vs 
BRAD FULLMER, 
Defendant 
and Appellee. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 910500012 
Judge James L. Shumate 
Pursuant to Rules 3 and 4, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, plaintiffs and appellants, GNS Partnership, Bryson 
Garbett, Jan Garbett, David Nipper, Betty Nipper, White Water 
Corporation, and Brian Stephensen, Partners, hereby give notice 
that they appeal the judgment entered August 18/ 1992, by the 
Honorable James L. Shumate, District Judge. This appeal is taken 
1 0 9 0 9 3 
1 1 0 9 - 6 4 9 
from the Fifth Judicial District Court of Was^...:on County, 
State of Utah, to the Utah Supreme Court, 
DATED this 3 ^ day of September, 1992. 
STRONG & HANNI 
By 
/JTZv^4 
Stuart H. Schultz 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Appeal was mailed, postage prepaid, on 
September ^ , 199 2, to the following: 
Keith W. Meade 
Cohne, Rappaport & Segal 
525 East 100 South #500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
£^7 . 
^ 
1 0 9 0 9 3 
1 1 0 9 - 6 4 9 
f ATb OP UTAH ) < 
-OUNTY OF WASHINGTON)' 
, true copy of the ortfl^ <secum*K'» m & 
ADDENDUM 4 
Stuart H. Schultz #2886 
H. Burt Ringwood #5787 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 532-7080 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON ] 
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVID ] 
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE ; 
WATER CORPORATION, AND BRIAN ] 
STEPHENSEN, Partners, ] 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ] 
BRAD FULLMER, 
Defendant. ] 
) AFFIDAVIT OF DAVID K. HOUSTON 
) 
Civil No. 910500012 
1 Judge James L. Shumate 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
County of Utah ) 
I, DAVID K. HOUSTON, do state as follows: 
1. I am a claim superintendent for State Farm Fire and 
Casualty Company and have held this position for 5 years. I 
have extensive experience with the coverage provided by 
homeowners and fire insurance policies. 
r- . 
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2. I have supervisory responsibility for the above-
referenced subrogation claim. 
3. I have personal knowledge that State Farm's subrogation 
claim was submitted to Prudential Insurance Company, the home 
owner's insurer for Brad Fullmer, through his parents' home 
owner's policy with Prudential. 
4. At no time did Prudential notify me that Brad Fullmer 
did not have liability coverage under his parents' policy. 
5. Homeowners insurance policies generally extend 
liability coverage for children of the homeowners who are living 
away from home as students. 
6. I have personal knowledge that State Farm Fire and 
Casualty writes and sells rental insurance for tenants which 
provides first-party coverage for personal property and liability 
coverage for damage caused by the tenant by fire to the apartment 
complex they live in. However, Brad Fullmer, as a student living 
away from home, would have been covered for liability under his 
parents' homeowners policy, and would not have needed a separate 
renters liability policy. 
Further affiant saith not. 
2 
DATED this 2 0th day of July, 1992. 
DAVID K. HOUSTON 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 3L/^ day of July, 
1992 by DAVID K. HOUSTON. 
/"$V 
My Commiss^a t 
Cctnm. X £ 
a3.2-24-30—» 
DEMN«S L JAMES 
278 No 2420 W. i * 
Frovo,UT A 
I 
^Ux V U > U O > A / ^ v fr > ^ 
Nota ry P u b l i c ^ - ^ 
R e s i d i n g a t LLX - L&+-^«^^ 
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ADDENDUM 5 
Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P. O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON ) 
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVID AFFIDAVIT OF 
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE ) BRAD FULLMER 
WATER CORPORATION, and BRIAN 
STEPHENSEN, Partners, ) 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs ) Civil No. 910500012 
BRAD FULLMER, ) Judge James L. Shumate 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
Brad Fullmer, upon oath, states as follows: 
1. I am the defendant in this action. I have personal 
knowledge of the matters set forth hereinafter. 
2. To the best of my knowledge, the lease agreement attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" was the lease that I signed to live at the 
Wedge Apartments. I did not negotiate the terms of the lease. It 
was on a printed form. The apartment was a furnished apartment 
that I shared with other students at Dixie College. I was 20 years 
of age at the time I signed the lease. 
3. At no time did the owner or any person tell me that I 
needed to or should obtain insurance of any type on the structure 
or property at the Wedge Apartments. This was never discussed, nor 
did I understand that it could possibly be required. I would have 
expected that the owner would have his own insurance of whatever 
type he felt necessarv. 
4. I never understood paragraph 1(b) of the lease to require 
me to obtain insurance. That paragraph does not mention the word 
insurance. The lease made no mention of insurance. I understood 
from paragraph 1(b) that if furniture or fixtures were damaged in 
the apartment as a result of abuse or roughhousing, that we would 
be responsible to replace those items. I never understood that if 
the apartment building burned as a result of something that 
happened in our apartment, that I would have to pay for the entire 
building. When I moved out of the apartments after the fire, the 
owners never advised me that I owed them any additional amount. No 
demand was made upon me by the owners or the apartment manager to 
pay for the damages caused by the fire. 
5. I understood paragraph 4 of the lease, which addresses 
11
 disorderly, immoral or unlawful conduct of any kind . . . " to mean 
that I would have to adhere to standards of gentlemanly conduct and 
that I could be asked to move from the apartments if my conduct 
fell below these standards. I never understood from paragraph 4 of 
the lease that if the apartments burned, that I would be required 
to pay the cost of rebuilding the apartments. I would have 
2 
expected that the owner would have insurance in the event this 
occurred. No one ever requested or even suggested that I obtain my 
own insurance on the structure. 
DATED this H day of May, 1992. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
s s 
E^T&d^F u l l m e r 
S u b s c r i b e d and sworn t o b e f o r e me t h i s / < / day of May, 
1992. 
7My/< ,• Wos) ('M#t a r y T?ubl i c 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC | 
PYPER STIVERS j 
525 £ast 100 South #500 
.alt Lake City, Utah 341C2 i 
Mv Commission Expires j 
August 27 1P9C I 
STATE OF UTAH I 
R e s i d i n g a t : 
3 
I CHO 1 
HOME PH0N6 NUMBER a 1\-Ory 
HOME AOORESS 1A$U \uin ***iA*?f.J. w / U f 
(S ] (City)' " •» * (State) (Zip) 
Name of Parent or Guardian 
This agreement is made and entered into this day ol ^between the above named tenant and The Wedge Premier 
Student Housing ("The Wedge" of the "Landlord") 
The landlord will provide the following service at The Wedge 
UTILITIES Water, sewer and garbage collection
 A ( 
SERVICES Vacuums off street parking and mail boxes ^ 
HOUSING You are assigned Unit $f\(^ This is subject to change ' J 
Tenant is contracting for housing at The Wedge tor the school year 19 ^ jo include FALL WINTER and SPRING QUARTERS This is an agreement to 
pay % 7 7 0 " f o f sa,<^ n o u s , n 9 P | us deposit <f{ ' "" 
Tenant will meet the following payment schedule lor the housing contract period 
DEPOSIT $1j)0 00 to be paid at the time of application for housing 
RENT $ 3 0 * ) - p£fl QUARTER (All rent is due and payable as indicated 10 days before the first day of classroom instruction for the indicated 
quarter If rent Has not been paid 10 days before classroom instruction begins landlord may assume you are not going to stay at The Wedge and. at its 
option may assign your space to someone else No room may be occupied unless rent is paid in full but failure to occupy premises does not negate 
tenants obligation to pay under this lease There is a SI 50 per day late fee for rents not paid on time Rents must be paid quarterly in advance NO 
MONTHLY PAYMENTS! 
Landlord's mailing address is The Wedge 335 So 1000 E St George Utah 84770 
Tenant hereby agrees to abide by the following rules and regulations 
1 The landlord or its managers shall retain the right of entry at any time WITHOUT NOTICE to any apartment unit for the purpose of inspecting 
the premises 
L Each apartment may be inspected on a weekly basis to check for general cleanliness and to determine the extent of any damaged or lost 
items provided by the landlord Each apartment is to be kept clean and presentable at all times Tenant will be given notice of these 
inspections Management may also hold one unscheduled inspection during each quarter If your apartment is unclean, has suffered any 
damage to premises furniture or fixtures and ts missing any furniture or fixtures tenant will be given 24 hour notice to correct the problem 
area Failure to make the needed corrections will result in all members of the apartment receiving thereafter a 24 hour notice to vacate the 
premises 
A Each tenant shall be responsible (or ail damage within their apartment on a joint and several basis Repairs or replacement of damaged 
items shall be made first from the collective deposits of all tenants within the apartment unit and, if necessary for an assessment for 
additional repair or replacement expenses to the tenants not covered by the deposes Refunds shall be made on a pro-rate basis' with each 
tenant in the unit sharing equally tn repair or replacement cost for the unit Any repainting or other redecoration of the units shall not be 
allowed without prior written consent of the landlord 
2 No guest shall occupy tn any fashion 2nd at any lime an apartment without the prior written approval of the landlord Guests lodged may be 
subject to a fee as determined by the landlord payable at the time permission is given Guests are subject to all housing regulations and the 
tenants m the unit housing such guest will be held jointly and severally responsible for any breach of regulations or for any damage caused by 
said guest All guests not given permission by landlord to occupy a unit shall leave the apartments no later than 12 00 p m Sun - Thurs, & 2 00 
a m Fn - Sat 
3 Quiet hours begin at 10 00 p m After th.s time loud and boisterous talking runnu g on walks or other noise that cause any manner of 
disturbance or nuisance shall cease Even though quiet hours do not begin until 10 00 p 1,1 students are expected to respect the rights of other 
students to privacy and quiet Students or guests are expected to knock before entering any aprtment or room other than their own NO 
MEMBER OF THE OPPOSITE SEX IS ALLOWEO IN THE BEDROOM BATHROOM OR HALL AREAS! While there are no -dorm" hours 
students are expected to leave and enter quietly after the 10 00 p m quiet hour No guests are allowed in any apartments alter 12 00 p m Sun 
Thurs & 2 00 a m Fn Sat 
4 DISORDERLY IMMORAL OR UNLAWFUL conduct of any kind whatsoevens forbidden No obscene pictures alcohol drugs tobacco or chewing tobacco loul 
or abusive language loud ot boisterous conduct o< destruction of property (Landlord s or tenants s) shall be permitted on the pr«mi<es (apartments parting tot 
sidewalks or lawns) Violation ol any ol the above will result in the immediate termination ol tenant s rental agreement and mandatory vacation of the apartment 
within 24 hours There are no exceptions to this rule Any tenant whose conduct in the sole opinion of the landlord is detrimental to The Wedge and/or its other 
residents shall vacate the premises within 24 hours of notice by landlord DEPOSITS AND RENTS WILL p c FORFEITED' 
5 Each tenant agrees to the respecKui use ot all facilities provided by the landlord and to respect the privac/ a properly of the other tenants 
8 If the room shows no wear or damage beyond normal use is properly cleaned and all light bulbs are working the tenant may at the end of the contract period 
receive a refund of lt\c cleaning and security deposit less carpet cleaning and excess electricity charges Charges to deposit could be as follows $10 00 per 
quarter for carpet cleaning wear and tear and light bulbs etc Deposits are refunded 30 days after a written request for a refund has been received with proper 
forwarding address If the student leaves before the end of the school year no refund of the deposit will be allowed No refunds will be made to tenants who have 
breached the rules and regulations contained herein 
7 One key to each apartment s mail box will be provided for a $10 00 deposit This key may be duplicated If said key is returned the $10 00 deposit will be 
refunded 
I No change of apartment or roommate assignments may be made without the prior written c* ent of the landlord All complaints or problems concerning 
roommates shall be mmediately and privately discussed with the landlord 
0 From tim* to time it may be neceswrv to move one or more tenants to another apartment to accommoda.e remodeling and to achieve maximum occupancy per 
unit Management does not intend to do any such sruttling but reserves the riyiu 10 thaiu^ dparimem a^ignmcrts if necessary Each \**™\
 w,n poi if *i v t 
possible be separated from those he o< she chooses to room with 
10 A late fee of $ I 50 per day will be charged tor 'er ts net recieved 10 days belore the first diy v.* cla srorn instructions for -ach quarter Each lensni agrees to 
pay a fee of $15 00 if his or he( rent check is dishonored and shall rep/ace such dishonored evek *ith cash certified check or money order 
I I The Wedge shall provide each apartment with beds couch chair and dinette set You may add your OWT „S desired Each tenant shall bring a mattress 
cover or bed pad for his or her bed (twin) Sleeping on a bed without a prober mattress cover will result u ture of the tenant s deposit The members ol 
each apartment are to provide their own shower curtains You will also need your own dishes pes ersonal linens 
12 Oue to the nature of the student housing no car washing oil changing or any other mechanical work on cars will be allowed in the parking lot or property 
13 Large groups of friends are not to be invited to nor are largt parties to be held on the premises or in the apartments 
14 No animals or pt\t of any kind will be alfowed on tht premises or m the apartments 
15 The unit* may b« occupied 10 days prior to the first day ol classroom instojction II a tenant desires to move in earlier he or she may do so with permission of the 
Landlord and upon payment ol a fee ol $5*00 ptt day per tenant 
11 Any tenant who is given notice to vacate the premises by the Landlord for any reason whatsoever shall not be entitled to a refund of his or her deposit or rent 
Names of all such persons wilt be submitted to Otxie College as well as to their parents 
H is the Intent of the Landlord and their managers lo keep The Wedge in superior condition Please report any problems to management as soom as Ihey occur 
In (he event any portion of this lease if found to be unenforceable or void at law and equity the remaining portions hereof shall not be effected thereby and shall 
remain in full force and affect 
EXHIBIT - k 
CONTRACTUALLY AGREED TO THE LANOLI . RIGHT AS OUTLINED ABOVE. 
Tenant's signature r^ N fl-d/ ' \ \U/ > U f ^ . / 
Landlord's approving sidhafure 
PARENTS* GUARANTEE: Because of the nature of Junior College Housing, we are usually providing a student with his or her first experience with tenant/landlord 
relationships. Although most students handle this wiJi. some have problems. As the parent or guardian of t u above-contracting tenant, by signing below you indicate 
that you understand the above agreement and will be responsible for the guarantee the perlormance by said tenant of all of his or her obligations under this agreement. 
Parent or Guardian signature Oate 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
of ^4ay7 The undersigned hereby certifies that on the ) / day 
1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, postage 
fully prepaid, to the following: 
Stuart Schultz 
H. Burt Ringwood 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Lh& 
d a / f u l I m e r a f f 
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ADDENDUM 6 
Keith W. Meade (Bar No. 2218) 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P. C. 
525 East First South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 11008 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0008 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorney for Defendant 
COPY 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
GNS PARTNERSHIP; BRYSON 
GARBETT; JAN GARBETT; DAVID 
NIPPER; BETTY NIPPER; WHITE 
WATER CORPORATION, and BRIAN 
STEPHENSEN, Partners, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs 
BRAD FULLMER, 
Defendant. 
ORDER REGARDING 
MOTIONS TO STRIKE 
Civil No. 910500012 
Judge James L. Shumate 
This matter came before the court for hearing on July 22, 
19 92, pursuant to competing Motions for Summary Judgment. The 
plaintiff was represented by counsel Stuart Schultz. Defendant was 
represented by counsel Keith W. Meade. 
The court has entered a separate Order with respect to the 
Motion for Summary Judgment. During the course of the proceeding, 
the court considered and ruled upon the plaintiff s objection dated 
July 1, 1992 to the Affidavit of Brad Fullmer, said affidavit being 
dated May 14, 1992. A second Motion to Strike the Affidavit of 
David Houston was filed by the defendant and was made at the time 
of the hearing. The affidavit had been sent by telefax to the 
court on July 21 with the original being filed on July 22 during 
the arguments. 
The court/ having considered the Affidavits and the Motions or 
Obj ections, hereby 
ORDERS as follows: 
1. BTfrfl FuUmQ? AJgftflgvJlt; pnfl P3,jdrQUf f' *? QfrlegUQPt The 
plaintiff's objection to the Affidavits is overruled and the 
Affidavit is received as filed. The court believes that it can 
winnow out any language which might be inadmissible as evidence. 
The court further observes that this affidavit had no bearing on 
the court' s ultimate ruling. 
2. David Houston Affidavit. The court finds that the 
Affidavit was not offered with respect to the determination of 
liability. Statements set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of 
the Affidavit are received. Statements set forth in paragraphs 5 
and 6 are stricken, in part upon the basis that they are not made 
upon personal knowledge and are not material or relevant to the 
proceedings. By striking these paragraphs, the Court remains 
mindful that renter' s insurance is available and plaintiffs do not 
need an affidavit to establish and argue the availability of 
renter' s insurance to cover personal property owned by an insured 
and liability. 
2 
DATED this lb day of August, 1992. 
Approved as to form: 
Stuart Schultz 
Strong & Hanni 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
BY THE COURT: 
Hoi^a^%^ames\ \L\ /sMmate 
Di s t i^ uct\ (Juiige"^  
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on the , j5 day of 
August, 1992, a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed, 
postage fully prepaid, to the following: 
Stuart Schultz 
H. Burt Ringwood 
STRONG & HANNI 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
600 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
hhj 
da/f uIlmer2.ord 
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